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ATIORNEY-CLIENT AND WORK PRODUCT 
PROTECTION IN A UTILITARIAN WORLD: AN 
ARGUMENT FOR RECOMPARISON 
Attorney-client privilege and work product immunity are closely 
connected. Both protect litigants, 1 and both stand in tension with the 
traditional notion that "the public ... has a right to every man's evi-
dence. "2 In practice, the two protections are even more closely identi-
fied, because they are often invoked together to protect identical 
materials.3 Moreover, the utilitarian justifications for the two protec-
tions are very similar, as are the critiques of those justifications.4 On 
the other hand, some commentators have argued that the attorney-cli-
ent privilege rests on a unique rationale for individual (as opposed to 
organizational) clients, because protection for attorney-client communi-
cations safeguards important individual rights. 5 Such rights-based ar-
guments persisted well into the twentieth century but have since faded 
from view.6 
Recently, the American Law Institute (ALI) began work on a Re-
statement of the Law Governing Lawyers. The tentative drafts of the 
Restatement discuss both the attorney-client7 and work product8 pro-
tections and incorporate notable innovations, particularly in the area 
of waiver. 9 In keeping with the modern trend, the ALI deemphasizes 
1 Both the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity protect litigants during dis-
covery. The attorney-client privilege prevents disclosure of protected communications at trial , as 
well as beforehand. See Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: 
Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1226 (I962) 
[hereinafter Overlap]. By contrast, "proponents of work product immunity claim that immunity 
really conceals nothing because facts are discoverable before trial, and trial strategy (opinion work 
product) will be disclosed at the trial itself." Elizabeth Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, 77 
VA. L. REV. ISIS, IS2S (199I). However, work product protection will sometimes result in the 
suppression of facts both before and during trial. See Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attor-
ney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 191, 264 n.220 (1989); 
Thornburg, supra, at 1SSS· Moreover, the great majority of cases are settled or otherwise re-
solved prior to trial, and disputes settled during discovery "risk a lopsided settlement based on 
incomplete information because of work product protection." /d. at IS2S. 
2 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (19SO) (quoting 8 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EviDENCE 
IN TRlALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192, at 70 (3d ed. 1942)). 
3 See Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. 
REv. 16os, I624 (1986). 
4 See infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes SI-SS and accompanying text. 
7 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
1989) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT, 1989 Draft]. Among other topics, the 1989 draft addresses at-
torney-client privilege, but not work product protection. 
8 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tentative Draft No. 6, 
1993) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT, 1993 Draft]. The 1993 draft covers work product protection, 
but not attorney-client privilege. 
9 Such innovations include the "work product as evidence" waiver. See infra Part II.C. 
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rights-oriented rationales for the attorney-client privilege and focuses 
instead on utilitarian justifications for each protection. However, cer-
tain disparities in the ALI's treatment of the two protections illustrate 
that rights-oriented thinking continues to exert a subtle influence over 
the treatment of the protections. Part I of this Note sets forth the 
nature of and traditional justifications for the protections and de-
scribes how the rise of the corporate client coincided with the fall of 
the rights-based argument for the attorney-client privilege. Using the 
ALI's drafts as a basis for discussion, Part II examines three areas -
waiver by disclosure, shareholder litigation, and "evidence" waiver -
in which differences between the treatment of the two protections 
should now be justified solely on utilitarian grounds. 
I. THE NATURE OF AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT AND WORK PRODUCT PROTECTIONS 
A typical formulation of the common law 10 attorney-client privilege 
has been expressed by the Second Circuit: 
(r) [W]here legal advice of any kind is sought (z) from a professional 
legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to 
that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his in-
stance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the 
legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived ... . 11 
Work product immunity, a much more recent innovation, is a crea-
ture of both case law and code. Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure codifies Hickman v. Taylor, 12 the first Supreme Court 
case to recognize protection for attorney work product. 13 Under Rule 
26(b)(3), work product protection extends to "documents and tangible 
things ... prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for 
[a] party or [a] party's representative."14 Although the Rule confines 
the protection to tangible items, federal common law extends immu-
nity to all work product regardless of the method of discovery. 15 
Work product protection, however, is not absolute and can be partially 
10 This Note focuses on federal common law interpretations of the attorney-client and work 
product protections. For the implications of diversity and federal question jurisdiction for federal 
courts' analyses of privilege issues, see Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1097-1100 (5th 
Cir. 1970). 
11 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated September rs, 1983 (Marc Rich & Co.), 
731 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Bein, 728 F.2d 107, II2 (2d Cir. 
1984) (quoting United States v. Kovel , 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (quoting 8 JoHN H . 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 
r96r)))); see also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 
rgso) (providing a similar but more detailed synopsis). 
12 329 u.s. 495 (1947). 
13 See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510. 
14 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3). 
IS See, e.g. , Hickman, 329 U.S. at srr; Clute v. Davenport Co., rr8 F.R.D. 312, 315 (D. Conn. 
1988). 
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pierced in certain circumstances. To obtain disclosure of otherwise 
protected work product, a party must show "substantial need of the 
materials in the preparation of the party 's case and that the party is 
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of 
the materials by other means."16 The fulfillment of these conditions, 
though, does not completely nullify work product protection. Even 
when a party demonstrates substantial need and undue hardship, the 
Rules instruct the court to guard against disclosure of "mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other 
representative of a party concerning the litigation."17 However, even 
absent a showing of need and hardship, underlying facts, as in the 
case of the attorney-client privilege,t 8 are fully discoverable. 19 
The justifications most often advanced for both protections are 
pragmatic and systemic. According to this view, the attorney-client 
privilege fosters full disclosure by clients to their attorneys, because 
the client has no fear that statements made in confidence can be used 
against her. This openness, in turn, enables attorneys to provide the 
best possible legal advice. 20 Optimal legal advice benefits not only the 
client, but also society, because sound advice conduces to "compliance 
with the ever growing and increasingly complex body of public law."21 
In addition, proponents of the attorney-client privilege claim that it 
increases the accuracy of trial results by "enhanc[ing] the quality of 
legal representation."22 Similarly, "the [work-product] doctrine is an 
intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our 
adversary system."23 In Hickman, the Supreme Court fashioned work 
product immunity as a zone of privacy24 within which lawyers could 
prepare for trial. 25 Without work product protection, some fear that 
the factfinding incentives generated by litigation would evaporate -
16 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3). 
17 /d. 
18 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (r98r). 
19 See Hickman, 329 U.S. at s I3. The framework for work product protection has been ex-
plained in the following way: 
Both Hickman and Rule 26(b)(3) envision a hierarchy of protection: (r) facts contained in 
work product, which are discoverable if a litigant can figure out the right question to ask; 
(2) ordinary work product, which is discoverable on a showing of substantial need and 
undue hardship; and (3) opinion work product, which is rarely, if ever, discoverable. 
Thornburg, supra note I, at 1520. 
20 See, e.g. , Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 39I, 403 (I976). 
2 1 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated September IS, 1983 (Marc Rich & Co.), 
731 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389, 392). 
22 Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REv. 3SI , 358 (1989). 
23 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975). 
24 For a discussion of the deceptively rights-oriented cast of the "zone of privacy" concept, see 
note 34 below. 
25 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, sro-II (1947). 
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and the adversary system would break down because litigants 
could rely on "wits borrowed from the adversary."26 
The pragmatic justifications for the two protections seem nearly 
identical at first glance. 27 As several commentators have noted, the 
Supreme Court 's rg8r decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States 28 illus-
trates the modern trend toward blending the two rationales. 29 In 
Upjohn, the Court relied upon work product precedent to justify its 
conclusions as to the proper scope of the attorney-client privilege.3o 
Because the Court and others have grounded the two protections in 
the same rationales, the utilitarian arguments for each are vulnerable 
to similar critiques.3 1 
However, the utilitarian justifications for the two protections may 
be more similar in form than in persuasiveness. The relative amounts 
of societal benefit generated by the protections are somewhat unclear 
due to the difficulty of gathering data on the degree to which work 
product immunity influences desirable trial preparation or the attor-
ney-client privilege encourages candid lawyer-client communication,32 
26 !d. at 5I6 (Jackson, J., concurring). Such fears grew out of the increase in the use of 
pretrial civil discovery that accompanied the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
1938. See RESTATEMENT, I993 Draft, supra note 8, at r. 
27 See Edward W. Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks: Jurisprudence of the Adversary System, I4 
VAND. L. REv. 865, 866-67 (r96I). 
28 449 U.S. 383 (I98I). 
29 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 3, at I623-24. 
30 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 39I-97· The Court used Hickman's work product rationale to 
explain its conclusion that the attorney-client privilege covers communications "made by Upjohn 
employees to counsel for Upjohn acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to 
secure legal advice from counsel." I d. at 394, 396-97. The Court emphasized the importance of 
the privilege to a lawyer's trial preparation. See id. at 390-9I (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 5 r I). 
In summation, the Court quoted Justice Jackson's famous aphorism about borrowed wits. See id. 
at 396. 
3! One scholar has proposed that work product immunity "be eliminated entirely." Thorn-
burg, supra note I, at I5 I 7i see also id. at 1528-29 (arguing that the elimination of work product 
immunity would have no "significant effect on a litigant 's actions in preparing for trial"). Regard-
ing the attorney-client privilege, one commentator argues that "while a preference for nondisclo-
sure rules exists, a substantial majority of laypersons would continue to use lawyers even if 
secrecy were limited." Zacharias, supra note 22, at 378. 
32 At least one commentator has speculated on the relative benefits produced by the two pro-
tections. See D. Christopher Wells, The Attorney Work Product Doctrine and Carry-Over Immu-
nity: An Assessment of Their Justifications, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 675, 683 (1986). 
However, empirical evaluation of the benefits accruing to society from the protections is diffi-
cult and has been sporadic and incomplete. One problem is that those surveyed may feel a vested 
interest in bolstering the protections by overstating their value. See Alexander, supra note r, at 
I97. There are four published studies, but they are limited in scope and encompass only attorney-
client, not work product protection. These studies are at best inconclusive with respect to the 
utility of the attorney-client privilege and are completely uninformative with regard to the desira-
bility of that privilege relative to work product protection. 
The first study surveyed, among others, I25 lawyers and Io8 laymen, see Overlap, supra note 
I, at I 2 6 r, I 2 69; of the laymen, only 2 I had consulted a lawyer "on any sort of a regular basis," 
see id. at 1262, and only ro had ever consulted a lawyer regarding a litigation matter, see id. 
T 
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but the two protections differ considerably in cost. For instance, work 
product immunity protects only materials prepared "in anticipation of 
litigation," whereas the attorney-client privilege attaches regardless of 
when the communication occurred.33 Thus, the attorney-client privi-
lege applies to more situations, a longer time span, and probably a 
greater amount of material than does work product immunity. Addi-
tionally, the purportedly absolute nature of the attorney-client privilege 
contrasts with the built-in "need and hardship" exception to ordinary 
work product immunity. Thus, when the issue of waiver arises, the 
costs of upholding one protection may differ from the costs of uphold-
ing the other. There may therefore exist valid utilitarian reasons for 
distinguishing the two protections. 
In addition to relying on utilitarian justifications, however, sup-
porters of the attorney-client privilege relied in the past on non-utilita-
rian rationales. From this perspective, an individual's attorney-client 
privilege possesses a rights-based justification to which neither work 
Fifty-five of the I08 laymen and 90 of the 125 lawyers indicated that the privilege encouraged 
communication. See id. at I 262 , I 2 70. 
A I983 study on the corporate attorney-client privilege surveyed 85 corporate attorneys and 36 
chief executive officers of companies drawn from the 1981 Fortune rooo list. See Eric P. Slater & 
Anita M. Sorenson, Empirical Research Project - Corporate Legal Ethics - An Empirical 
Study: The Model Rules, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Counsel's Continuing Strug-
gle Between Theory and Practice, 8 J. CoRP. L. 6oi, 604 nn.s-6 (I983). Twelve out of the rs 
executives who answered the question responded that an assurance of confidentiality would make 
them more willing to comply with a legal investigation. See id. at 625 n.139. 
A third study, this one from I989, analyzed survey results from 63 lawyers and ros layper-
sons; of the non-lawyers, 32 had never consulted a lawyer. See Zacharias, supra note 22, at 379. 
A majority of the laypersons stated that they would withhold information from their lawyer if the 
lawyer said "that he/she could not guarantee confidentiality but that, except in unusual cases, he/ 
she would keep information secret." !d. at 386. 
In another 1989 study on the corporate attorney-client privilege, a law professor interviewed 
so in-house corporate counsel, 52 law firm partners, and 52 corporate executives. See Alexander, 
supra note I, at 204. Forty-one of the 52 executives "indicated that they had been concerned 
about the applicability of privilege at least once in the past five years," id. at 242, and 39 of the 
52 thought that the privilege "serve[d] to increase management's candor with counsel," id. at 246. 
If there has been little data gathered regarding the actual societal benefits of the attorney-
client privilege, even less is known with regard to work product - even the more outspoken 
critics of the work product doctrine are unable to point to any empirical studies on the subject. 
See Thornburg, supra note I, at I526-38; Wells, supra, at 683 . Because no known empirical 
studies have focused on the work product protection, no data exist to support distinctions between 
benefits arising from the incentive structures created by the two protections. 
33 Because the attorney-client privilege is designed, in part, to encourage compliance with the 
law, its scope cannot be confined to communications made in anticipation of litigation; issues of 
compliance arise outside as well as inside the litigation context. 
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product immunity34 nor an organization's attorney-client privilege3s 
can lay claim. Thus, commentators argued that confidential lawyer-
client communications preserve the client's individual autonomy,36 pri-
vacy,37 and dignity and safeguard the attorney's loyalty to the client_38 
The one-time popularity of these rights-based rationales39 may help to 
explain the lack of empirical study devoted to the benefits and costs of 
the privilege: supporters insisted that the personal values involved 
were so precwus as to obviate the need to balance those values against 
other concerns. 40 
34 The work product doctrine does implicate certain personal interests on the part of the law-
yer. The Supreme Court noted in Hickman that "[e]xamination into a person's files and records, 
including those resulting from the professional activities of an attorney, must be judged with care. 
It is not without reason that various safeguards have been established to preclude unwarranted 
excursions into the privacy of a man 's work." Hickman, 329 U.S. at 497. Similarly, the Court 
remarked that, without the protection, "[a]n attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not 
be his own." /d. at $II. However, concern for the lawyer's privacy is inseparable from concern 
for "the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our sys-
tem of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' interests." I d. at s I o-u. As 
Justice Jackson put it, "[t]he primary effect of the practice advocated here would be on the legal 
profession itself. But it too often is overlooked that the lawyer and the law office are indispensa-
ble parts of our administration of justice." /d. at 514-15 (Jackson, J., concurring). Work product 
thus differs significantly from the individual's attorney-client privilege. The concerns for privacy 
in work product protection are merely concerns for ensuring the efficient administration of justice. 
Thus, discussions of work product have tended to focus on systemic costs and benefits to the 
exclusion of concerns for lawyers' privacy. The concerns for privacy in the context of the attor-
ney-client privilege, by contrast, are personal rights-based concerns that often run counter to con-
cerns of efficiency and accuracy in adjudication. See infra notes 37 and 40. 
35 See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. 
36 In his seminal article on the lawyer-client relation, Professor Fried explained: 
[T]he social nexus - the web of perhaps entirely just institutions - has become so com-
plex that without the assistance of an expert adviser an ordinary layman cannot exercise 
that autonomy which the system must allow him ... . When I say the lawyer is his client's 
legal friend, I mean the lawyer makes his client 's interests his own insofar as this is neces-
sary to preserve and foster the client's autonomy within the law. 
Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 
YALE L.J. ro6o, 1073 (1976). 
37 "[T]here are things even more important to human liberty than accurate adjudication. One 
of them is the right to be left by the state unmolested in certain human relations." David W. 
Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. 
L. REV. IOI, IIO (19$6). 
38 As Francis Bacon observed: 
The greatest trust betweene man and man is the trust of giving Counsell. For in other 
confidences men commit the parts of life; their lands, their goods, their children, their 
credit, some particular affaire; but to such, as they make their Counsellours, they commit 
the whole: by how much the more they are obliged to all faith and integrity. 
FRANCIS BACON, Of Counsell, in THE ESSAYES OR COUNSELS C!VILL & MORALL OF FRANCIS 
BACON 65, 65 (Heritage Press 1944) (1597). Professor Louisell quoted this passage in defense of 
the attorney-client privilege. See Louisell, supra note 37, at rr2-r3. 
39 This focus on individual rights often appeared in general discussions of testimonial privi-
lege. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). 
40 See Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. ro6o, ro65 
(1975); see also RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90--{)4 (1977) ("It follows from 
the definition of a right that it cannot be outweighted by all social goals."). 
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Although scholars once used a rights-based analysis to justify the 
individual's attorney-client privilege, few attempted to do so for corpo-
rate clients. 41 Critics of a corporate attorney-client privilege note that 
corporations have no claim to the personal rights that underpin the 
attorney-client privilege. Corporations consist of people, but those peo-
ple do not hold the privilege; instead, the corporation holds and has 
the ability to waive any privilege that would otherwise attach to com-
munications between an employee and corporate counsel.42 Nor could 
a rights-based argument rest on the view that the corporation stands 
in the shoes of its owners. Although the corporation usually is consid-
ered a legal "person,"43 it is rarely so viewed in the context of personal 
privacy, autonomy, and dignity.44 Any privacy interests that a corpo-
ration does possess are property interests rather than intimate personal 
rights. 45 
The inapplicability of the rights-based argument to corporations 
may help explain why that argument gradually sank from view. 46 Un-
til the mid-twentieth century, corporations did not usually find them-
selves in courtY Thus, the attorney-client privilege originally 
developed as a personal privilege. However, as corporations increas-
ingly began to litigate disputes,48 courts afforded the privilege to the 
corporate client as well.49 The increasing prominence of corporate liti-
41 See Alexander, supra note I, at 225. But see Fried, supra note 36, at I075-76. 
42 See Marcus, supra note 3, at I 62 r. 
43 See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporate and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Sug-
gested Approach, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 2 79, 2 79 (I 984). 
44 See id.; Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional 
Entitlement, 9I HARV. L. REv. 464, 484 (I977) [hereinafter Balancing]. 
45 See James A. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (pt. 2), 8 VILL. L. 
REv. 447, 498 (I963); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corpo-
rate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. I57, 185-86 (I993); Balancing, supra 
note 44, at 473· 
46 See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. 
47 The stock-in-trade of corporate lawyers reflected the non-litigiousness of their clients. By 
the turn of the century, "the great corporate lawyers of the day drew their reputations more from 
their abilities in the conference room and facility in drafting documents than from their persua-
siveness before the courts." I ROBERT SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 
1819-1947 , at 37I (1946), quoted in MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAW-
YERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW fiRM 6 (I991). 
48 As late as the early I96os, "manufacturers avoided litigation, preferring to rely upon infor-
mal norms and sanctions to control relations with competitors, suppliers, and customers." GA-
LANTER & PALAY, supra note 47, at sr. The last quarter-century, however, has seen "a great 
surge of [corporate] litigation," fueled by "[a) business environment that is more competitive, more 
insecure, and more uncertain." !d. 
49 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389--90 (I98I) (noting that the Supreme 
Court "has assumed that the privilege applies when the client is a corporation') (citing United 
States v. Louisville & N .R.R, 236 U.S. 3I8, 336 (I9I5)). 
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gants may have changed the traditional balance between utilitarian 
and rights-based arguments for the attorney-client privilege.50 
Whatever the causes, the former solicitude for personal rights no 
longer animates discussions of the attorney-client privilege.51 Instead, 
commentators now debate the merits of the utilitarian rationale.SZ In 
Upjohn, the Supreme Court devoted a page-long discourse to the priv-
ilege's utilitarian basis - without ever mentioning the rights-based ra-
tionale.53 The ALI drafts address the attorney-client and work 
product protections almost entirely in light of utilitarian theory. 54 As 
one court recently noted of the attorney-client privilege, "[t]he proposi-
tion is that the detriment to justice from a power to shut off inquiry to 
pertinent facts in court, will be outweighed by the benefits to justice 
(not to the client) from a franker disclosure in the lawyer's office."55 
SO Some commentators maintain, on utilitarian grounds, that both work product and attorney-
client protection are less desirable in the case of corporate clients. See, e.g., Thornburg, supra 
note 45, at I 93 . Such considerations, however, are beyond the scope of this Note. 
5l Cf United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.zd I285, I292 (2d Cir. I99I) ("[T]he underlying ration-
ale for the [attorney-client] privilege has changed over time .... "). Even now, the attorney-client 
privilege retains a connection to rights discourse, because the privilege serves other goals that are 
currently accepted as personal rights, especially with regard to criminal defendants . S ee, e.g., 
United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. I989) ("Without the attorney-client privi-
lege, [the right to counsel] and many other rights belonging to those accused of crime would in 
large part be rendered meaningless."). In such instances, however, the individual's special claim 
to the privilege appears to spring from the underlying right, not from an inherent right to the 
attorney-client privilege. 
52 See, e.g., George A. Davidson & William H. Voth, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 
64 OR. L. REv. 63 7, 638 (I986); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information 
to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, I02 HARV. L. REV. 567, 6I3-IS 
(I989); Saltzburg, supra note 43, at 282-85. 
53 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. One could argue that the Upjohn Court emphasized utility 
rather than rights because the corporate privilege holder in Upjohn, in contrast to individual 
holders of the privilege, could not make rights arguments for the privilege. See supra p. I 703. 
However, the Court made clear in Upjohn that its discussion applied to the attorney-client privi-
lege generally, as well as to corporate attorney-client privilege in particular. S ee Upjohn, 449 U.S. 
at 389--<)0. 
54 See RESTATEMENT, I989 Draft, supra note 7, § I I8 cmt. c (addressing the attorney-client 
privilege); RESTATEMENT, I993 Draft, supra note 8, § I36 cmt. b (discussing work product protec-
tion). After devoting one and a half pages to the utilitarian rationale for the attorney-client privi-
lege, the I989 draft makes brief mention of "[o]ther justifications [that] can be urged for the 
privilege": a "fairness" concern with the provision of legal advice to those exposed to legal liabil-
ity, the right to counsel, and (in language reminiscent of the Hickman line of work product prece-
dent) "a zone of privacy within which a client may more effectively exercise . . autonomy." 
RESTATEMENT, I989 Draft, supra note 7, § I I8 cmt. c. The draft also notes that "the privilege 
furthers a societal interest in protecting privacy by assuring that there are some areas into which 
official prying cannot reach. " !d. § rr8 reporter's note, at 82. 
55 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d I414, 1423 (3d Cir. I99I) 
(quoting McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 204 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 979 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989) ("The raison d'etre of the hallowed attorney-client privilege is the protection of a cli-
ent's communications to counsel so that persons, including organizations, will be induced to con-
sult counsel when needed."). 
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The death of the rights-based arguments for the attorney-client 
privilege, though perhaps desirable,56 makes it necessary to reevaluate 
the traditional parameters of the attorney-client and work product pro-
tections. Doctrines that appeared sensible when purpose-oriented ar-
guments were intertwined with rights arguments may no longer be 
persuasive when viewed solely in the light of utility. T he discussion 
that follows focuses on three instances in which such a reexamination 
would prove useful. 
II. UNJUSTIFIED DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES 
The disparate treatment that the Restatement drafts give the two 
protections in the areas of waiver by disclosure, shareholder litigation, 
and "evidence" waiver may stem from the traditional rights-oriented 
underpinnings of the attorney-client privilege . If both protections are 
now recognized to serve utilitarian goals alone, however, rights-based 
rationales no longer provide a principled basis for analysis . 
To contemporary courts and commentators, the avowed goals of 
the two protections are to improve the functioning of the adversary 
system and, in the case of the attorney-client privilege, also to en-
courage compliance with complicated regulatory systems. The incen-
tives used to achieve these goals target different entities - lawyers or 
clients - depending on the type of protection; a difference in the in-
centive systems may mean that one protection produces greater bene-
fits than the other. The societal costs of the protections may also 
differY Utilitarian considerations may thus provide a basis for distin-
guishing the two protections, but courts and commentators should be 
clear that any distinctions they draw stem from utility, not from an 
inadvertent perpetuation of rights discourse. 
Although the modern consensus is that the protections should be viewed in relation to their 
social purposes, courts also have articulated concerns of fairness to the party seeking disclosure, 
especially in the waiver context. See, e.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, I22I 
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The emphasis 
on fairness to the other side contrasts with the former focus on fairness to - or rights of - the 
privilege holder and can be seen as linked to the systemic concern for producing just outcomes. 
56 See Thornburg, supra note 45, at r82 (criticizing as "[p]rivacy and [r]elationship [m]yths ... 
the belief that courts should not compel revelation of attorney-client confidences"); Zacharias, 
supra note 22, at 367 n.73 ("Despite the rhetoric in commentaries, lawyers are not unique in their 
relationship to clients .... " (citation omitted)); id. at 368 (observing that the "dignity" argument 
"applies to all professions"); id. at 369 (arguing that "the lawyer who contributes to the notion 
that the client can get away with anything demeans the client as a moral individual"); Balancing, 
supra note 44, at 482 ("To impose restrictions simply on the process by which individuals learn of 
their rights is no different from the countless qualifications attached for utilitarian purposes to the 
full exercise of other rights in society."); id. at 483 ("Friends and lovers ... are surely at least as 
intimate in their interactions as an attorney and his client."). 
57 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
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A. Waiver by Disclosure 
In accord with long-established tradition,58 the ALI draft provides 
that "[t]he attorney-client privilege ... is waived if the client, the cli-
ent's lawyer, or another authorized agent of the client substantially 
discloses the communication in a non-privileged communication."5 9 
Work product, by contrast, is waived by disclosure only if "a party 
entitled to assert the immunity or the party's lawyer or other author-
ized representative ... [d]iscloses the material to third persons in cir-
cumstances in which there is a significant likelihood that an adversary 
or potential adversary will obtain it. "60 The disparity between the two 
standards for waiver traditionally has been explained with a nominally 
purpose-oriented argument. The removal of the rights-based mystique 
from the attorney-client privilege, however, should prompt a reevalua-
tion of that argument. 
The ALI draft explains the draconian sweep of the disclosure 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege by asserting that such disclosure 
"is inconsistent with a claim that the client does not wish the commu-
nication disclosed"; indeed, it observes that disclosure to a non-privi-
leged party may in some circumstances "indicate that the client did 
not originally contemplate confidentiality."61 This contention begs the 
question of the value to the adversary system of total - as opposed to 
situational - confidentiality. The rationale for the privilege is to en-
courage full and frank disclosure by clients of facts that may assist 
their lawyers in giving the best possible legal advice. Clients will not 
make such disclosure, the argument goes, unless they are assured that 
their confidences will go no further than their lawyers. Although cur-
rent studies of the question have proved inconclusive,62 common sense 
dictates that at least some clients will hesitate to disclose some mate-
rial facts absent an assurance that the disclosures will not be passed 
along to their adversaries. There is a sharp distinction, however, be-
tween wishing to keep facts from one's adversary and wishing to keep 
them from the entire world. Under a utilitarian analysis, the privilege 
is justified only to the extent that it maximizes the efficiency of the 
lawyer-client relationship. The privilege induces clients to be frank 
58 See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 
1950). 
59 RESTATEMENT, 1989 Draft, supra note 7, § 129. 
60 RESTATEMENT, 1993 Draft, supra note 8, § 140 (emphasis added); see also Stix Prod., Inc. 
v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("The work-product privi-
lege should not be deemed waived unless the disclosure is inconsistent with maintaining secrecy 
from possible adversaries.'l 
6I RESTATEMENT, 1989 Draft, supra note 7, § 129 cmt. b; see also In re Auclair, 961 F.2d 65, 
69 (5th Cir. 1992) (observing that disclosure to a third person "eliminates the intent for confidenti-
ality on which the privilege rests"). 
62 See supra note 32. 
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with their lawyers by promising protection from adversaries, not from 
the rest of the planet.63 
In contrast to the systemic benefits that now constitute the ac-
cepted justification for the attorney-client privilege, both the rhetoric 
and substance of the "waiver by disclosure" doctrine betray the contin-
ued influence of the rights-based argument. A representative exam-
ple64 is Judge Friendly's explanation of how a client had waived his 
privilege by disclosure to his accountant in In re Horowitz. 65 Judge 
Friendly began with the "basic principle[]" that "[t]he privilege finds 
its justification in the need to allow a client to place in his lawyer the 
'unrestricted and unbounded confidence' that is viewed as essential to 
the protection of his legal rights."66 This description is typical in its 
evocation of the sanctity and absolute nature of the attorney-client re-
lationship. Judge Friendly concluded that "[i]t is not asking too much 
to insist that if a client wishes to preserve the privilege under such 
circumstances, he must take some affirmative action to preserve confi-
dentiality" by not allowing a third party to gain access to the commu-
nications.67 Ironically, this view of the attorney-client relationship as 
sacrosanct actually limits protection, because it leads to an unduly 
high standard of client conduct for the preservation of confidentiality. 
It requires the client to justify the privilege as though it were truly 
invoked against the world as a whole, rather than specifically against 
the client's adversary.68 
A second example of rights-oriented reasoning is the argument that 
the disclosure waiver should apply differently to the two protections, 
because the attorney-client privilege exists "to protect the attorney-cli-
ent relationship," whereas the work product doctrine exists "to pro-
mote the adversary system."69 If no dispositive values inhere in the 
63 See Marcus, supra note 3, at 1625. 
64 Others abound. See, e.g., United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 
(D.C. Cir. 1980). 
65 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1973). 
66 /d. at 81 (citation omitted). 
67 /d. at 82. 
68 See Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Work, 110 F.R.D. 500, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The 
attorney-client privilege is a narrower privilege precisely because its protection is absolute. Any 
breach of confidentiality between attorney and client, with limited exceptions, constitutes a 
waiver."). 
69 United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (emphasis 
omitted). 
Similarly, the Third Circuit has justified distinctions with regard to the disclosure waiver by 
claiming that the attorney-client privilege, in contrast to work product protection, exercises only 
an indirect influence over the functioning of the legal system. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. 
Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991). The court in Westinghouse failed 
to articulate completely why the influence of the attorney-client privilege on the legal system was 
less "direct" than that of the work product doctrine, but the court's phraseology suggests the view 
that the attorney-client privilege exists, first and foremost, to "promote[] the attorney-client rela-
tionship." /d. In the absence of a rights-based rationale for the privilege, however, this reasoning 
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attorney-client relationship, however, the relationship is valuable only 
as a means to improve the legal system - valuable, in other words, 
for the same reason as the work product protection. 
The modern consensus is that the attorney-client privilege seeks to 
further the adversary system by facilitating the best possible advocacy. 
Thus, the ALI's discussion of work product disclosure applies equally 
to the attorney-client privilege: 
Effective trial preparation may entail sharing work product with copar-
ties and nonparties. Work product, including work product of a lawyer, 
therefore may generally be shared freely among the client, the client's 
lawyer or other representative, associated lawyers and other professionals 
working on the matter in the interest of the client, actual or potential 
coparties, or a client's business advisers or agents. Such sharing is con-
sistent with the objective of fostering effective pretrial preparation and 
with maintaining privacy against an adversary. 70 
The applicability of this rationale to the attorney-client privilege is 
already recognized to some extent in the "joint defense" or "common 
interest" exception to the waiver by disclosure. Currently, the attor-
ney-client privilege may persist despite disclosure to certain third par-
ties, because courts recognize "[t]he need to protect the free flow of 
information from client to attorney . . . whenever multiple clients 
share a common interest about a legal matter."71 However, in order 
for a common interest to preserve the privilege despite disclosure, 
courts require "that the nature of the interest [shared with the third 
party] be identical, not similar, and be legal, not solely commercial."72 
This limitation conflicts with the utilitarian insight that the benefits of 
the protection stem from the actions of a person whose concern is 
maintaining privacy from his adversary, rather than the world at 
mistakes the means for the end; directness of effect is not the main concern of the utilitarian 
perspective. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 514-15 (1947) Gackson, J., concurring). With-
out a rights-based foundation, the Westinghouse court's distinction between the attorney-client 
and work product protections collapses. 
70 RESTATEMENT, 1993 Draft, supra note 8, § 140 cmt. e. 
7! United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Daniel J. Capra, 
The Attorney-Client Privilege in Common Representations , 20 TRIAL LAW. Q., Summer 1989, at 
20, 2 r) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
72 Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. rr46, 1172 (D.S.C. 1974); see also In 
re Auclair, 96r F.2d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that the privilege is not waived if the "commu-
nication is shared with a third person who has a common legal interest" (quoting Hodges, Grant 
& Kaufman v. United States Government, 768 F.2d 719, 721 (Sth Cir. 1985))). Duplan defines a 
shared "legal interest" as a "duty or direct transaction between the two clients of the attorney." 
Duplan, 397 F. Supp. at 1175; see also Weil Ceramics, rro F.R.D. at 503 (limiting the community 
of interest rule to situations involving legal duties to defend or "client transaction[s] between two 
separate entities which are represented by the same attorney"). 
The common interest exception to waiver of the privilege has engendered an intricate body of 
case law on the question of precisely what kinds of parties share the requisite commonality of 
interest. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990); Bauman v. 
Jacobs Suchard, 136 F.R.D. 460, 461-62 (N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Te-
cum Dated November r6, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
r 
r 
( 
I 
I 995] ATTORNEY-CLIENT AND WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION 
large. The likely parity of incentives (and thus of benefits) supports 
the protection of attorney-client communications, like work product, 
unless the disclosure increased the likelihood that an adversary would 
obtain the protected material. A utilitarian analysis , however, must 
look to costs as well as benefits. Because the attorney-client privilege 
covers more material over a longer period of time and is more durable 
than work product immunity, courts may consider that a narrower 
construction of waiver of the attorney-client privilege would deprive 
parties and tribunals of too much relevant information. 73 Such a utili-
tarian distinction may be legitimate - but the invocation of rights 
discourse should not suffice. 
B. Shareholder Litigation 
Shareholder litigation is another area in which attorney-client com-
munications enjoy less protection than do work product materials. As 
in the case of waiver by disclosure, the discrepancy seems to stem m 
part from the vestigial influence of rights discourse. 
The ALI's proposed exception to the attorney-client privilege in 
shareholder litigation against organizational fiduciaries rests on the 
well-known decision in Garner v. Wolfinbarger,7 4 in which the Fifth 
Circuit held that shareholder plaintiffs could discover otherwise privi-
leged communications between corporate defendants and their counsel 
upon a showing of cause. 75 Following Garner's lead, the ALI draft 
nullifies the attorney-client privilege in a proceeding that involves a 
dispute between an "organizational client" and its constituents if of-
ficers or directors are charged with a breach of fiduciary duties, the 
communication occurred prior to the suit and is directly relevant, and 
the tribunal makes a finding of need and appropriateness. 76 
However, the ALI suggests no comparable exception to the work 
product protection. 77 This omission cannot reflect an absence of need: 
in shareholder litigation, materials protected as work product may well 
prove to be equally as important as communications protected under 
the attorney-client privilege. 78 Nor can the omission stem from the 
built-in exception to work product protection activated upon a show-
ing of substantial need and undue hardship; such a showing, though it 
73 Courts may also feel relatively comfortable with waiver by disclosure, because the waiver 
generally depends on a voluntary act of the privilege holder. The holder's volition, though no 
longer relevant to show a relinquishment of the holder's "rights," may indicate that clients' incen-
tives would be relatively unaffected by a finding of waiver. By contrast, a waiver doctrine that 
ignores the actions of the holder may significantly distort clients' and lawyers' incentives. See 
infra p. 1712. 
74 430 F.zd 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). 
75 See id. at r 103-04. 
76 See RESTATEMENT, 1989 Draft, supra note 7, § 134. 
77 See RESTATEMENT, 1993 Draft, supra note 8. 
78 See, e.g., Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, go F.R.D. 583, 588 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
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would justify the production of ordinary work product, would leave 
opinion work product absolutely protected even though the latter 
might be extremely useful to shareholder plaintiffs. 
T he courts that accept Garner but refuse to apply it to work prod-
uct have not advanced a compelling rationale. For example, in Dono-
van v. Fitzsimmons ,7 9 the court explained its refusal thus: 
The Garner rule forecloses the use of the attorney-client privilege, itself 
intended for the ultimate benefit of the client, to prevent disclosure of a 
breach of the client's trust. Shareholders or beneficiaries, however, do 
not stand in the same position with respect to the attorney, for whom the 
work-product rule is designed to benefit, as they do to their own 
trustees. 80 
There are at least two flaws in this argument. First, even if the 
court 's focus on the intended beneficiaries of the protection is apposite, 
it fails to identify those beneficiaries correctly. Garner's recognition 
that a corporation's "management has duties which run to the benefit 
ultimately of the stockholders"81 m_eans that the attorney-client privi-
lege, to the extent that it benefits anyone aside from society at large, 
ultimately benefits the shareholders.8 2 Similarly, the work product 
rule, by improving the conditions under which the attorney works, 
benefits the attorney primarily to benefit the client and, through the 
client, the adversary system.83 Of course, the issue of who the client 
really is complicates this question. Arguably, when work product is 
prepared in anticipation of litigation between the corporation and its 
shareholders, the shareholders can no longer be considered to have a 
sufficient mutuality of interest to qualify as clients of the corporate 
counseJ.84 This argument, however, applies equally to the attorney-
client privilege, because once the shareholders' interests become ad-
verse to the corporation's, the shareholders may no longer be consid-
ered to hold the privilege. 85 On the other hand, Garner provides that, 
leaving aside the question whether the shareholders participate in the 
attorney-client relationship, the fiduciary relationship entitles share-
79 !d. 
80 Id. at 587-88. 
81 Garner v . Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 Csth Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S . 974 
(1971). 
!d. 
82 As the court argued in Garner: 
The representative and the represented have a mutuality of interest in the representative 's 
freely seeking advice when needed and putting it to use when received .. . . [M]anagement 
judgment must stand on its merits, not behind an ironclad veil of secrecy which under all 
circumstances preserves it from being questioned by those for whom it is , at least in part, 
exercised. 
83 Attorneys cannot legitimately claim a proprietary interest in their work product, especially 
because they are paid for their services. See Thornburg, supra note I, at 1544. 
84 See In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1239 (sth Cir . 
1982). 
85 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1994). 
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holders in some instances to pierce protections intended to benefit the 
corporation. This insight should apply, to the extent it applies at all, 
to work product as well as the attorney-client privilege. Additionally, 
although the mutuality of interest argument is more persuasive than a 
bald statement that work product inures to the benefit of the lawyer 
rather than the client, the argument does not address instances in 
which work product is prepared in anticipation of litigation between 
the corporation and non-shareholders.86 
Second, the Donovan court's assumption that the intended benefits 
inure primarily to either the client or the lawyer ignores the modern 
shift from a rights-based to a utilitarian view of the work product and 
attorney-client protections. In light of the fact that both protections 
find their justifications in their effect on the legal system, any benefit 
to the individual parties is important, not as an end in itself, but 
merely for the incentives it creates to promote systemic goals. In this 
regard, the question who "benefits" is relevant only if the incentive 
effect arising from a protection works differently for clients' decisions 
to communicate with their lawyers than it does for lawyers' decisions 
to prepare for trial. 
Perhaps courts' reluctance to extend Garner to work product pro-
tection indicates a discomfort with Garner itself. 87 If so, the ALI 
should perhaps reconsider the merits of Garner. If, instead, the restric-
tion of Garner to the attorney-client privilege stems from underlying 
utilitarian concerns, courts should substitute an explicit utilitarian 
calculus for rights-oriented rhetoric. 
C. "Evidence" Waiver 
The ALI drafters' concept of waiver encompasses both knowing, 
or voluntary, waiver and also (irrespective of intent or state of mind) 
certain other conduct by the privilege holder.88 In the case of work 
product, however, the drafters, in effect, extend the waiver to situa-
tions involving no act at all on the part of the client by allowing the 
party seeking discovery the ability to trigger a "work product as evi-
86 Work product prepared for prior, unrelated litigation seems likely to comprise a significant 
amount of the work product sought by plaintiffs in shareholder litigation, because the status of 
such work product is frequently litigated and because most courts will protect such work product 
in subsequent litigation. See Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 
760, sss n.581, 856 (1983). 
87 Although most jurisdictions that have considered the issue tend to follow Garner, see, e.g. , 
Fausek v. White, 965 F.2d 126, 130 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, II3 S. Ct. 814 (1992), other jurisdic-
tions do not, see, e.g., Shirvani v. Capital Investing Corp., II2 F.R.D. 389, 39D-91 (D. Conn. 
1986), cited in Bradford D. Bimson, Note, Zirn v. VLI Corp.: The Far-Reaching Implications of 
Loquacity, 19 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1067, 1086 n.126 (1994); Dickerson v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. 
Rptr. 97, 99 (Ct. App. 1982). 
88 See RESTATEMENT, 1989 Draft, supra note 7, Title C introductory note, at 198 . The draft-
ers' lack of emphasis on voluntariness and knowledge accords in some ways with the conception 
of the privilege as proceeding from a strictly utilitarian standpoint. 
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dence" waiver . Both an analysis of case law and a comparison with 
the attorney-client privilege argue against the recognition of such a 
WaiVer. 
T he ALI's "evidence" waiver dramatically expands traditional 
waiver doctrine.89 In section qrA, entitled "Work Product as Evi-
dence," the ALI draft provides simply that "[ w ]ork product that consti-
tutes direct and substantial evidence of a material issue before a 
tribunal is subject to disclosure by order of the tribunal when access is 
required for a fair trial of the issue. "90 Unlike other waiver provi-
sions,91 section I4 rA contains no limitations on the type of subject 
matter that could trigger the waiver. Although the section cites a 
somewhat narrow range of cases - all of which involve questions of 
the knowledge or state of mind of the holder of the protection - the 
majority of hotly contested materials may fall precisely within this 
range. 92 Even more important, section qrA allows a waiver in the 
absence of any action by the holder of the protection. As the Com-
ment notes: 
[L] oss of the immunity under § 141A is created by action of the party 
seeking the otherwise protected material. The difference in strategic po-
sitions of the holder and the opponent of immunity justifies stricter scope 
to loss of immunity under this Section , which deals with initiatives taken 
by the opponent. 9 3 
Perhaps for this reason, the commentary to section 14 rA warns that 
"[t]he disclosure ordered should be no greater than required for the 
purpose. "94 
A problem with the ALI's evidence waiver is that the draft cites 
only ten cases, only two of which appear to use an analysis similar to 
89 "Work product as evidence" waiver is one of a larger set of waivers that could be generally 
termed "at issue" waivers. A prime example of an at issue waiver is the waiver based on a 
client's assertion of advice of counsel - a waiver that the courts and the ALI agree should 
extend to both kinds of protection. The ALI's tentative draft contains an exception to the attor-
ney-client privilege in cases in which the client asserts "as to a material issue in a proceeding that: 
(a) The client acted upon the advice of a lawyer or that the advice was otherwise relevant to the 
legal significance of the client's conduct; or (b) A lawyer 's assistance was ineffective, negligent, or 
for some other reason wrongful. " REsTATEMENT, 1989 Draft, supra note 7, § 130(1). The work 
product draft contains a substantially similar waiver provision . See RESTATEMENT, 1993 Draft, 
supra note 8, § 141(4). A notable example in the context of the attorney-client privilege is United 
States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292-94 (2d Cir. 1991). 
90 RESTATEMENT, 1993 Draft, supra note 8, § 141A. 
91 See, for instance, the advice of counsel waiver, discussed above in note 89. 
92 Indeed, the material at stake in a case involving the evidence waiver will, by definition , be 
hotly contested and important, because to qualify for the waiver, the material must be both "di-
rect and substantial evidence of a material issue" and "required for a fair trial." RESTATEMENT, 
1993 Draft, supra note 8, § 141A. Some have criticized the evidence waiver's emphasis on the 
relevance or importance of the material to the issues in the case as running counter to the goals of 
the protections. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
93 RESTATEMENT, 1993 Draft, supra note 8, § 141A cmt. b. 
94 !d. cmt. c. 
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the ALI's. Despite the draft's explanation that "[t]he [r4r A] exception 
reflec ts a balance somewhat different than the exception for need and 
hardship" for ordinary work product, 95 none of the ten cases cited in 
the Reporter's Note to section I4I A appear. to use a "work product as 
evidence" analysis as such. Instead, each court stated or implied that 
the party seeking disclosure of work product must show "substantial 
need" and "undue hardship."96 One of the two cases that came some-
what closer to the ALI's formulation of evidence waiver, Donovan v. 
Fitzsimmons ,97 held that, because the protected materials were directly 
at issue, "circumstances ... warrant[ed] the presumptive application" 
of the need and hardship exception.98 A second court, in In re Sunrise 
Securities Litigation, 99 attempted a further break from the undue 
hardship aspect of the traditional need and hardship analysis by argu-
ing that, when the work product is directly at issue, "a party is not 
required to prove that information cannot be discovered by any 
method other than document production."100 The court supported this 
argument, however, with language redolent of undue hardship analysis 
by claiming that "contemporaneous records have 'an inherent reliabil-
ity which cannot now be duplicated by any other source of 
evidence. "'101 
A comparison of work product to the attorney-client privilege ar-
gues against the evidence waiver. Critics claim that the evidence 
waiver in the attorney-client context would detrimentally affect the 
creation of protected material - material that is desirable because its 
existence reflects communications that further the goals of the legal 
system. With the substitution of the lawyer's incentives for those of 
the client, the same arguments apply equally well to work product 
doctrine. As one court noted of the attorney-client privilege: 
[F] inding that confidentiality may be waived depending on the relevance 
of the communication completely undermines the interest to be served. 
Clients will face the greatest risk of disclosure for what may be the most 
important matters. Furthermore, because the definition of what may be 
95 !d. cmt. a. 
96 See Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F .2 d 573 , 577 (gth Cir. 1992); In re 
International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 12 35, 1240-41 (5th Cir. 1982); Bio-Rad 
Lab ., Inc. v. Pharmacia, Inc., 130 F.R.D. II6, 12 r (N.D. Cal. 1990); In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 
F.R.D. s6o, 568 & n.24 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 
125 F .R.D. 127, 131 (M.D.N.C. rg8g); Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, go F .R.D. 583 , 588 (N.D. Ill. 
rg8r ); APL Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 91 F .R.D. 10, 14 (D. Md. rg8o); Handgards, Inc . v. 
Johnson & Johnson, 413 F . Supp. 926, 931 (N.D. Cal. 1976); SEC v. National Student Mktg. 
Corp., r8 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1302, 1305 , I3II (D.D.C. 1974); Bird v. Penn Cent. Co., 6r 
F.R.D. 43 , 46 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
97 go F.R.D. 583 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
98 !d. at 588. 
99 130 F.R.D. 560 (E.D. Pa. rgSg). 
1oo Id. at 568. 
101 !d. at 568 n. 24 (quoting In re Hawaii Corp., 88 F.R.D. 518, 525 (D. Haw. rg8o)). 
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relevant and discoverable from those consultations may depend on the 
facts and circumstances of as yet unfiled litigation, the client will have 
no sense of whether the communication may be relevant to some future 
issue, and will have no sense of certainty or assurance that the communi-
cation will remain confidential. 102 
This fear that the most important matters may also be the least pro-
tected is as likely to inhibit lawyer preparation as it is to chill client 
communication. Moreover, uncertainty as to the posture of future liti-
gation will afflict lawyers as well as clients: not even an experienced 
practitioner can always predict the strategies of an adversary or the 
rulings of a court. Unless the costs of work product protection are 
found to be greater than those of the attorney-client privilege , 103 the 
same incentive-oriented analysis that leads courts to refuse to apply an 
evidence waiver to attorney-client privilege should militate against a 
finding of the "work product as evidence" waiver. 104 
III. CONCLUSION 
The rights-based arguments for the attorney-client privilege were 
perhaps never more than rhetorically persuasive. Courts, however, 
have often relied on such arguments to bolster their conclusions about 
the proper scope of the privilege. In the context of waiver, many 
courts base distinctions between the attorney-client and work product 
protections on assumptions drawn from rights discourse. The distinc-
tions themselves may prove legitimate - but they should only be ac-
cepted as such after a rigorous and purely utilitarian analysis. 
102 Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc . v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 85I, 864 (3 d Cir. I994) . Although 
its critique raises important questions, the Rhone-Poulenc court failed to note that the importance 
of the material cuts both ways in the cost-benefit analysis. Although an evidence waiver for 
important material may reduce the incentives of lawyers and clients to engage in desirable com-
munication or trial preparation, it will probably not completely curtail these activities. Assuming 
that litigants and lawyers continue to create some otherwise protected material, the waiver will 
benefit the iegal system by providing factfinders with important information. 
103 Such a result seems unlikely. See supra p. r 701. 
104 In fact, courts have considered evidence waiver with regard to both protections, not just 
with regard to work product. See, e.g., National Indus. Transformers, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. 
Co., No. 91 Civ. 7I92, I993 WL I58373, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May II, I993) (refusing to find an 
evidence waiver of attorney-client and work product material); Leucadia, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. 
Co., IOI F.R.D. 674, 679 (S.D.N.Y. I983) (refusing to find an evidence waiver of attorney-client 
material). 
